Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/209

SoK: Peigen -- a Platform for Evaluation, Implementation, and Generation of S-boxes

Zhenzhen Bao and Jian Guo and San Ling and Yu Sasaki

Abstract: In this paper, a platform named PEIGEN is presented to evaluate security, find efficient software/hardware implementations, and generate cryptographic S-boxes. Continuously developed for decades, S-boxes are constantly evolving in terms of the design criteria for both security requirements and software/hardware performances. PEIGEN is aimed to be a platform covering a comprehensive check-list of design criteria of S-boxes appearing in the literature. To do so, the security requirements are first intensively surveyed, existing tools of S-boxes are then comprehensively compared, and finally our platform PEIGEN is presented. The survey part is aimed to be a systematic reference for the theoretical study of S-boxes. The platform is aimed to be an assistant tool for the experimental study and practical use of S-boxes. PEIGEN not only integrates most of the features in existing tools, but also equips with functionalities to evaluate new security-related properties, improves the efficiency of the search algorithms for optimized implementations in several aspects. With the help of this powerful platform, many interesting observations are made in-between the security notations, as well as on the S-boxes used in the existing symmetric-key cryptographic primitives. PEIGEN will become an open platform and welcomes contributions from all parties to help the community to facilitate the research and use of S-boxes.

Category / Keywords: S-box, Survey, Design criteria, Implementation criteria, New platform

Original Publication (in the same form): IACR-TOSC ISSUE 1-2019

Date: received 23 Feb 2019

Contact author: zzbao at ntu edu sg, guojian@ntu edu sg, lingsan@ntu edu sg, yu339@yahoo co jp, sasaki yu@lab ntt co jp

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190227:025956 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/209


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