Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/184

Face-off between the CAESAR Lightweight Finalists: ACORN vs. Ascon

William Diehl and Farnoud Farahmand and Abubakr Abdulgadir and Jens-Peter Kaps and Kris Gaj

Abstract: Authenticated ciphers potentially provide resource savings and security improvements over the joint use of secret-key ciphers and message authentication codes. The CAESAR competition has aimed to choose the most suitable authenticated ciphers for several categories of applications, including a lightweight use case, for which the primary criteria are performance in resource-constrained devices, and ease of protection against side channel attacks (SCA). In March 2018, two of the candidates from this category, ACORN and Ascon, were selected as CAESAR contest finalists. In this research, we compare two SCA-resistant FPGA implementations of ACORN and Ascon, where one set of implementations has area consumption nearly equivalent to the defacto standard AES-GCM, and the other set has throughput (TP) close to that of AES-GCM. The results show that protected implementations of ACORN and Ascon, with area consumption less than but close to AES-GCM, have 23.3 and 2.5 times, respectively, the TP of AES-GCM. Likewise, implementations of ACORN and Ascon with TP greater than but close to AES-GCM, consume 18 percent and 74 percent of the area, respectively, of AES-GCM.

Category / Keywords: implementation / Side-channel, DPA, CAESAR, authenticated cipher, countermeasure, FPGA, FOBOS

Original Publication (with major differences): 2018 International Conference on Field Programmable Technology

Date: received 19 Feb 2019, last revised 4 Mar 2019

Contact author: wdiehl at vt edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190304:174315 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/184


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