Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/163

Fast Side-Channel Security Evaluation of ECC Implementations: Shortcut Formulas for Horizontal Side-channel Attacks against ECSM with the Montgomery ladder

Melissa Azouaoui and Romain Poussier and François-Xavier Standaert

Abstract: Horizontal attacks are a suitable tool to evaluate the (nearly) worst-case side-channel security level of ECC implementations, due to the fact that they allow extracting a large amount of information from physical observations. Motivated by the difficulty of mounting such attacks and inspired by evaluation strategies for the security of symmetric cryptography implementations, we derive shortcut formulas to estimate the success rate of horizontal differential power analysis attacks against ECSM implementations, for efficient side-channel security evaluations. We then discuss the additional leakage assumptions that we exploit for this purpose, and provide experimental con firmation that the proposed tools lead to good predictions of the attacks' success.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / Elliptic Curve Cryptography, side-channel attacks, side-channel security evaluation, Horizontal Differential Power Analysis

Original Publication (in the same form): COSADE 2019

Date: received 14 Feb 2019

Contact author: melissa azouaoui at outlook com,melissa azouaoui@nxp com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190220:174334 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/163


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