Paper 2019/163

Fast Side-Channel Security Evaluation of ECC Implementations: Shortcut Formulas for Horizontal Side-channel Attacks against ECSM with the Montgomery ladder

Melissa Azouaoui, Romain Poussier, and François-Xavier Standaert

Abstract

Horizontal attacks are a suitable tool to evaluate the (nearly) worst-case side-channel security level of ECC implementations, due to the fact that they allow extracting a large amount of information from physical observations. Motivated by the difficulty of mounting such attacks and inspired by evaluation strategies for the security of symmetric cryptography implementations, we derive shortcut formulas to estimate the success rate of horizontal differential power analysis attacks against ECSM implementations, for efficient side-channel security evaluations. We then discuss the additional leakage assumptions that we exploit for this purpose, and provide experimental confirmation that the proposed tools lead to good predictions of the attacks' success.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. COSADE 2019
Keywords
Elliptic Curve Cryptographyside-channel attacksside-channel security evaluationHorizontal Differential Power Analysis
Contact author(s)
melissa azouaoui @ outlook com
melissa azouaoui @ nxp com
romain poussiercr @ gmail com
History
2020-01-21: revised
2019-02-20: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/163
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/163,
      author = {Melissa Azouaoui and Romain Poussier and François-Xavier Standaert},
      title = {Fast Side-Channel Security Evaluation of ECC Implementations: Shortcut Formulas for Horizontal Side-channel Attacks against ECSM with the Montgomery ladder},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/163},
      year = {2019},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/163}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/163}
}
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