Paper 2019/1488
Fine-Grained Cryptography Revisited
Shohei Egashira, Yuyu Wang, and Keisuke Tanaka
Abstract
Fine-grained cryptographic primitives are secure against adversaries with bounded resources and can be computed by honest users with less resources than the adversaries. In this paper, we revisit the results by Degwekar, Vaikuntanathan, and Vasudevan in Crypto 2016 on fine-grained cryptography and show constructions of three key fundamental fine-grained cryptographic primitives: one-way permutations, hash proof systems (which in turn implies a public-key encryption scheme against chosen chiphertext attacks), and trapdoor one-way functions. All of our constructions are computable in $\mathsf{NC}^1$ and secure against (non-uniform) $\mathsf{NC}^1$ circuits under the widely believed worst-case assumption $\mathsf{NC}^1 \subsetneq \oplus \mathsf{L/poly}$.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in ASIACRYPT 2019
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-030-34618-8_22
- Keywords
- Fine-grained cryptographyNC1 circuitOne-way permutationHash proof systemTrapdoor one-way function
- Contact author(s)
-
egashira s aa @ m titech ac jp
wangyuyu @ uestc edu cn
keisuke @ is titech ac jp - History
- 2019-12-30: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/1488
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/1488,
author = {Shohei Egashira and Yuyu Wang and Keisuke Tanaka},
title = {Fine-Grained Cryptography Revisited},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/1488},
year = {2019},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-34618-8_22},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1488}
}
