Paper 2019/1472

Efficient Fully Secure Leakage-Deterring Encryption

Jan Camenisch, Maria Dubovitskaya, and Patrick Towa

Abstract

Encryption is an indispensable tool for securing digital infra- structures as it reduces the problem of protecting the data to just protecting decryption keys. Unfortunately, this also makes it easier for users to share protected data by simply sharing decryption keys. Kiayias and Tang (ACM CCS 2013) were the first to address this important issue pre-emptively rather than a posteriori like traitor tracing schemes do. They proposed leakage-deterring encryption schemes that work as follows. For each user, a piece of secret information valuable to her is embedded into her public key. As long as she does not share her ability to decrypt with someone else, her secret is safe. As soon as she does, her secret is revealed to her beneficiaries. However, their solution suffers from serious drawbacks: (1) their model requires a fully-trusted registration authority that is privy to user secrets; (2) it only captures a CPA-type of privacy for user secrets, which is a very weak guarantee; (3) in their construction which turns any public-key encryption scheme into a leakage-deterring one, the new public keys consist of linearly (in the bit-size of the secrets) many public keys of the original scheme, and the ciphertexts are large. In this paper, we redefine leakage-deterring schemes. We remove the trust in the authority and guarantee full protection of user secrets under CCA attacks. Furthermore, in our construction, all keys and ciphertexts are short and constant in the size of the secrets. We achieve this by taking a different approach: we require users to periodically refresh their secret keys by running a protocol with a third party. Users do so anonymously, which ensures that they cannot be linked, and that the third party cannot perform selective failure attacks. We then leverage this refresh protocol to allow for the retrieval of user secrets in case they share their decryption capabilities. This refresh protocol also allows for the revocation of user keys and for the protection of user secrets in case of loss or theft of a decryption device. We provide security definitions for our new model as well as efficient instantiations that we prove secure.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. MINOR revision.IMA CCC 2019
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-35199-1_6
Contact author(s)
tow @ zurich ibm com
jan @ dfinity org
maria @ dfinity org
History
2019-12-23: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/1472
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/1472,
      author = {Jan Camenisch and Maria Dubovitskaya and Patrick Towa},
      title = {Efficient Fully Secure Leakage-Deterring Encryption},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/1472},
      year = {2019},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-35199-1_6},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1472}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1472}
}
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