Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/1470

PESTO: Proactively Secure Distributed Single Sign-On, or How to Trust a Hacked Server

Carsten Baum and Tore K. Frederiksen and Julia Hesse and Anja Lehmann and Avishay Yanai

Abstract: Single Sign-On (SSO) is becoming an increasingly popular authentication method for users that leverages a trusted Identity Provider (IdP) to bootstrap secure authentication tokens from a single user password. It alleviates some of the worst security issues of passwords, as users no longer need to memorize individual passwords for all service providers, and it removes the burden of these service to properly protect huge password databases. However, SSO also introduces a single point of failure. If compromised, the IdP can impersonate all users and learn their master passwords. To remedy this risk while preserving the advantages of SSO, Agrawal et al. (CCS'18) recently proposed a distributed realization termed PASTA (password-authenticated threshold authentication) which splits the role of the IdP across $n$ servers. While PASTA is a great step forward and guarantees security as long as not all servers are corrupted, it uses a rather inflexible corruption model: servers cannot be corrupted adaptively and --- even worse --- cannot recover from corruption. The latter is known as proactive security and allows servers to re-share their keys, thereby rendering all previously compromised information useless.

In this work, we improve upon the work of PASTA and propose a distributed SSO protocol with proactive and adaptive security (PESTO), guaranteeing security as long as not all servers are compromised at the same time. We prove our scheme secure in the UC framework which is known to provide the best security guarantees for password-based primitives. The core of our protocol are two new primitives we introduce: partially-oblivious distributed PRFs and a class of distributed signature schemes. Both allow for non-interactive refreshs of the secret key material and tolerate adaptive corruptions. We give secure instantiations based on the gap one-more BDH and RSA assumption respectively, leading to a highly efficient 2-round PESTO protocol. We also present an implementation and benchmark of our scheme in Java, realizing OAuth-compatible bearer tokens for SSO, demonstrating the viability of our approach.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Single Sign-On, Authentication, Identity Provider, Distributed Protocols

Date: received 20 Dec 2019, last revised 9 Jan 2020

Contact author: juliahesse2 at gmail com, cbaum@cs au dk

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20200109:103711 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/1470


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