Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/1465

An optimist's Poisson model of cryptanalysis

Daniel R. L. Brown

Abstract: Simplistic assumptions, modeling attack discovery by a Poisson point process, lead to quantifiable statistical estimates for security assurances, supporting the wisdom that more independent effort spent on cryptanalysis leads to better security assurance, but hinting security assurance also relies significantly upon general optimism.

The estimates also suggest somewhat better security assurance from compounding two independent cryptosystems, but perhaps not enough to outweigh the extra cost.

Category / Keywords: foundations / foundations, cryptanalysis, statistics, Poisson

Date: received 18 Dec 2019

Contact author: danibrown at blackberry com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20191218:195647 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/1465


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