Paper 2019/1442

Server-Aided Revocable Identity-Based Encryption Revisited

Fei Meng

Abstract

Efficient user revocation has always been a challenging problem in identity-based encryption (IBE). Boldyreva et al. (CCS 2008) first proposed and formalized the notion of revocable IBE (RIBE) based on a tree-based revocation method. In their scheme, each user is required to store a number of long-term secret keys and all non-revoked users have to communicate with the key generation center periodically to update its decryption key. To reduce the workload on the user side, Qin et al. (ESORICS 2015) proposed a new system model, server-aided revocable IBE (SR-IBE). In SR-IBE model, each user is required to keep only one private key $$ and unnecessary to communicate with the key generation center or the server during key updating. However, in their security model, the challenge identity $$ must be revoked once the private key $$ was revealed to the adversary. This is too restrictive since decrypting a ciphertext requires both the private key $$ and the long-term transformation key $$. In this paper, we first revisit Qin et al.'s security model and propose a stronger one called SSR-sID-CPA security. Specifically, $$ is revoked only when both $$ and $$ are revealed and the adversary is allowed to access short-term transformation keys oracle. We also prove that Qin et al.'s scheme is insecure under our new security model. Second, we construct a lattice-based SR-IBE scheme based on Katsumata's RIBE scheme (PKC 19), and show that our lattice-based SR-IBE scheme is SSR-sID-CPA secure. Finally, we propose a generic construction of SR-IBE scheme by combining a RIBE and a 2-level HIBE scheme. The security of the generic SR-IBE scheme inherits those of the underlying building blocks.