Paper 2019/1420
A Non-Interactive Shuffle Argument With Low Trust Assumptions
Antonis Aggelakis, Prastudy Fauzi, Georgios Korfiatis, Panos Louridas, Foteinos Mergoupis-Anagnou, Janno Siim, and Michal Zajac
Abstract
A shuffle argument is a cryptographic primitive for proving correct behaviour of mix-networks without leaking any private information. Several recent constructions of non-interactive shuffle arguments avoid the random oracle model but require the public key to be trusted. We augment the most efficient argument by Fauzi et al. [Asiacrypt 2017] with a distributed key generation protocol that assures soundness of the argument if at least one party in the protocol is honest and additionally provide a key verification algorithm which guarantees zero-knowledge even if all the parties are malicious. Furthermore, we simplify their construction and improve security by using weaker assumptions while retaining roughly the same level of efficiency. We also provide an implementation to the distributed key generation protocol and the shuffle argument.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. CT-RSA 2020
- Keywords
- subversion securitynon-interactive zero-knowledgeshufflesecure multi-party computation
- Contact author(s)
-
jannosiim @ gmail com
m p zajac @ gmail com
prastudy fauzi @ gmail com
louridas @ grnet gr - History
- 2019-12-10: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/1420
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/1420,
author = {Antonis Aggelakis and Prastudy Fauzi and Georgios Korfiatis and Panos Louridas and Foteinos Mergoupis-Anagnou and Janno Siim and Michal Zajac},
title = {A Non-Interactive Shuffle Argument With Low Trust Assumptions},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/1420},
year = {2019},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1420}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1420}
}
