Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/1420

A Non-Interactive Shuffle Argument With Low Trust Assumptions

Antonis Aggelakis and Prastudy Fauzi and Georgios Korfiatis and Panos Louridas and Foteinos Mergoupis-Anagnou and Janno Siim and Michal Zajac

Abstract: A shuffle argument is a cryptographic primitive for proving correct behaviour of mix-networks without leaking any private information. Several recent constructions of non-interactive shuffle arguments avoid the random oracle model but require the public key to be trusted.

We augment the most efficient argument by Fauzi et al. [Asiacrypt 2017] with a distributed key generation protocol that assures soundness of the argument if at least one party in the protocol is honest and additionally provide a key verification algorithm which guarantees zero-knowledge even if all the parties are malicious. Furthermore, we simplify their construction and improve security by using weaker assumptions while retaining roughly the same level of efficiency. We also provide an implementation to the distributed key generation protocol and the shuffle argument.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / subversion security, non-interactive zero-knowledge, shuffle, secure multi-party computation

Original Publication (with minor differences): CT-RSA 2020

Date: received 6 Dec 2019

Contact author: jannosiim at gmail com,m p zajac@gmail com,prastudy fauzi@gmail com,louridas@grnet gr

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20191210:075430 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/1420


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