Decryption failure is more likely after success

Nina Bindel; John M.  Schanck

Paper 2019/1392

Decryption failure is more likely after success

Nina Bindel and John M. Schanck

Abstract

The user of an imperfectly correct lattice-based public-key encryption scheme leaks information about their secret key with each decryption query that they answer---even if they answer all queries successfully. Through a refinement of the D'Anvers--Guo--Johansson--Nilsson--Vercauteren--Verbauwhede failure boosting attack, we show that an adversary can use this information to improve his odds of finding a decryption failure. We also propose a new definition of $\delta$-correctness, and we re-assess the correctness of several submissions to NIST's post-quantum standardization effort.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. PQCrypto 2020
Keywords: public-key cryptography lattice-based cryptography decryption failure
Contact author(s): nlbindel @ uwaterloo ca
jschanck @ uwaterloo ca
History: 2020-02-07: revised; 2019-12-04: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2019/1392
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/1392,
      author = {Nina Bindel and John M.  Schanck},
      title = {Decryption failure is more likely after success},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/1392},
      year = {2019},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1392}
}