Paper 2019/139

Vulnerability and Remedy of Stripped Function Logic Locking

Hai Zhou, Yuanqi Shen, and Amin Rezaei

Abstract

Stripped Function Logic Locking (SFLL) as the most advanced logic locking technique is robust against both the SAT-based and the removal attacks under the assumption of thorough resynthesis of the stripped function. In this paper, we propose a bit-coloring attack based on our discovery of a critical vulnerability in SFLL. In fact, we show that if only one protected input pattern is discovered, then the scheme can be unlocked with a polynomial number of queries to an activated circuit. As a remedy to this vulnerability, we also propose a provably secure general function that deregularizes the relation between the protected input patterns and the secret key. The mathematical proofs as well as the experiments confirm both the polynomiality of the bit-coloring attack on standard SFLL and the exponentiality of similar attacks on SFLL with general function.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Logic LockingSAT-based AttackStripped Function Logic LockingOne Way Function
Contact author(s)
yuanqishen2020 @ u northwestern edu
History
2019-02-14: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/139
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/139,
      author = {Hai Zhou and Yuanqi Shen and Amin Rezaei},
      title = {Vulnerability and Remedy of Stripped Function Logic Locking},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/139},
      year = {2019},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/139}
}
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