Paper 2019/139
Vulnerability and Remedy of Stripped Function Logic Locking
Hai Zhou, Yuanqi Shen, and Amin Rezaei
Abstract
Stripped Function Logic Locking (SFLL) as the most advanced logic locking technique is robust against both the SAT-based and the removal attacks under the assumption of thorough resynthesis of the stripped function. In this paper, we propose a bit-coloring attack based on our discovery of a critical vulnerability in SFLL. In fact, we show that if only one protected input pattern is discovered, then the scheme can be unlocked with a polynomial number of queries to an activated circuit. As a remedy to this vulnerability, we also propose a provably secure general function that deregularizes the relation between the protected input patterns and the secret key. The mathematical proofs as well as the experiments confirm both the polynomiality of the bit-coloring attack on standard SFLL and the exponentiality of similar attacks on SFLL with general function.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Logic LockingSAT-based AttackStripped Function Logic LockingOne Way Function
- Contact author(s)
- yuanqishen2020 @ u northwestern edu
- History
- 2019-02-14: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/139
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/139,
author = {Hai Zhou and Yuanqi Shen and Amin Rezaei},
title = {Vulnerability and Remedy of Stripped Function Logic Locking},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/139},
year = {2019},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/139}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/139}
}
