Paper 2019/1386

Provably Secure Three-party Password-based Authenticated Key Exchange from RLWE (Full Version)

Chao Liu, Zhongxiang Zheng, Keting Jia, and Qidi You

Abstract

Three-party key exchange, where two clients aim to agree a session key with the help of a trusted server, is prevalent in present-day systems. In this paper, we present a practical and secure three-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol over ideal lattices. Aside from hash functions our protocol does not rely on external primitives in the construction and the security of our protocol is directly relied on the Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE) assumption. Our protocol attains provable security. A proof-of-concept implementation shows our protocol is indeed practical.

Note: Several errors have been corrected.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision.ISPEC2019
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-34339-2_4
Keywords
Password authenticationThree-party Key exchangeProvable securityRLWEPost-quantum
Contact author(s)
liu_chao @ mail sdu edu cn
ktjia @ mail tsinghua edu cn
History
2021-04-08: revised
2019-12-04: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/1386
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/1386,
      author = {Chao Liu and Zhongxiang Zheng and Keting Jia and Qidi You},
      title = {Provably Secure Three-party Password-based Authenticated Key Exchange from RLWE (Full Version)},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/1386},
      year = {2019},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-34339-2_4},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1386}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1386}
}
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