Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/1349

UWB-ED: Distance Enlargement Attack Detection in Ultra-Wideband

Mridula Singh and Patrick Leu and AbdelRahman Abdou and Srdjan Capkun

Abstract: Mobile autonomous systems, robots, and cyber-physical systems rely on accurate positioning information. To conduct distance-measurement, two devices exchange signals and, knowing these signals propagate at the speed of light, the time of arrival is used for distance estimations. Existing distance- measurement techniques are incapable of protecting against adversarial distance enlargement—a highly devastating tactic in which the adversary reissues a delayed version of the signals transmitted between devices, after distorting the authentic signal to prevent the receiver from identifying it. The adversary need not break crypto, nor compromise any upper- layer security protocols for mounting this attack. No known solution currently exists to protect against distance enlargement. We present Ultra-Wideband Enlargement Detection (UWB-ED), a new modulation technique to detect distance enlargement attacks, and securely verify distances between two mutually trusted devices. We analyze UWB-ED under an adversary that injects signals to block/modify authentic signals. We show how UWB-ED is a good candidate for 802.15.4z Low Rate Pulse and the 5G standard.

Category / Keywords: applications / Distance Bounding, Distance Enlargement Attack, Ultra-Wideband

Original Publication (in the same form): Usenix Security

Date: received 22 Nov 2019

Contact author: mridula singh at inf ethz ch

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20191127:080824 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/1349


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