Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/1341

Succinct Non-Interactive Secure Computation

Andrew Morgan and Rafael Pass and Antigoni Polychroniadou

Abstract: We present the first maliciously secure protocol for succinct non-interactive secure two-party computation (SNISC): Each player sends just a single message whose length is (essentially) independent of the running time of the function to be computed. The protocol does not require any trusted setup, satisfies superpolynomial-time simulation-based security (SPS), and is based on (subexponential) security of the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption. We do not rely on SNARKs or "knowledge of exponent"-type assumptions.

Since the protocol is non-interactive, the relaxation to SPS security is needed, as standard polynomial-time simulation is impossible; however, a slight variant of our main protocol yields a SNISC with polynomial-time simulation in the CRS model.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / secure computation, two-party computation, succinct, non-interactive, quasi-polynomial simulation

Date: received 20 Nov 2019

Contact author: asmorgan at cs cornell edu,rafael@cs cornell edu,antigonipoly@gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20191122:182611 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/1341


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