Paper 2019/134
Tighter security proofs for generic key encapsulation mechanism in the quantum random oracle model
Haodong Jiang, Zhenfeng Zhang, and Zhi Ma
Abstract
In (TCC 2017), Hofheinz, Hoevelmanns and Kiltz provided a fine-grained and modular toolkit of generic key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) constructions, which were widely used among KEM submissions to NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization project.
The security of these generic constructions in the quantum random oracle model (QROM) has been analyzed by Hofheinz, Hoevelmanns and Kiltz (TCC 2017), Saito, Xagawa and Yamakawa (Eurocrypt 2018), and Jiang et al. (Crypto 2018).
However, the security proofs from standard assumptions are far from tight.
In particular, the factor of security loss is
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- quantum random oracle modelkey encapsulation mechanismgeneric construction
- Contact author(s)
- hdjiang13 @ gmail com
- History
- 2019-02-14: revised
- 2019-02-13: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/134
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/134, author = {Haodong Jiang and Zhenfeng Zhang and Zhi Ma}, title = {Tighter security proofs for generic key encapsulation mechanism in the quantum random oracle model}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/134}, year = {2019}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/134} }