Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/1298

An Efficient Passive-to-Active Compiler for Honest-Majority MPC over Rings

Mark Abspoel and Anders Dalskov and Daniel Escudero and Ariel Nof

Abstract: Multiparty computation (MPC) over rings such as $\mathbb{Z}_{2^{32}}$ or $\mathbb{Z}_{2^{64}}$ has received a great deal of attention recently due to its ease of implementation and attractive performance. Several actively secure protocols over these rings have been implemented, for both the dishonest majority setting and the setting of three parties with one corruption. However, in the honest majority setting, no \emph{concretely} efficient protocol for arithmetic computation over rings has yet been proposed that allows for an \emph{arbitrary} number of parties. We present a novel compiler for MPC over the ring $\mathbb{Z}_{2^{k}}$ in the honest majority setting that turns a semi-honest protocol into an actively secure protocol with very little overhead. The communication cost per multiplication is only twice that of the semi-honest protocol, making the resultant actively secure protocol almost as fast.

To demonstrate the efficiency of our compiler, we implement both an optimized 3-party variant (based on replicated secret-sharing), as well as a protocol for $n$ parties (based on a recent protocol from TCC 2019). For the 3-party variant, we obtain a protocol which outperforms the previous state of the art that we can experimentally compare against. Our $n$-party variant is the first implementation for this particular setting, and we show that it performs comparably to the current state of the art over fields.

Category / Keywords: Rings, MPC, Honest Majority, Compiler, Active Security

Original Publication (in the same form): ACNS 2021

Date: received 7 Nov 2019, last revised 12 Dec 2020

Contact author: m a abspoel at cwi nl, ariel nof at biu ac il, anderspkd at cs au dk, escudero at cs au dk

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20201212:174313 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/1298


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