Paper 2019/1277

Towards Quantum-Safe VPNs and Internet

Maran van Heesch, Niels van Adrichem, Thomas Attema, and Thijs Veugen

Abstract

Estimating that in 10 years time quantum computers capable of breaking public-key cryptography currently considered safe could exist, this threat is already eminent for information that require secrecy for more than 10 years. Considering the time required to standardize, implement and update existing networks signifies the urgency of adopting quantum-safe cryptography. In this work, we investigate the trade-off between network and CPU overhead and the security levels defined by NIST. To do so, we integrate adapted OpenSSL libraries into OpenVPN, and perform experiments on a large variety of quantum-safe algorithms for respectively TLS versions 1.2 and 1.3 using OpenVPN and HTTPS independently. We describe the difficulties we encounter with the integration and we report the experimental performance results, comparing setting up the quantum-safe connection with setting up the connection without additional post-quantum cryptography.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint. Minor revision.
Contact author(s)
niels vanadrichem @ tno nl
History
2019-11-05: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/1277
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/1277,
      author = {Maran van Heesch and Niels van Adrichem and Thomas Attema and Thijs Veugen},
      title = {Towards Quantum-Safe VPNs and Internet},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/1277},
      year = {2019},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1277}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1277}
}
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