Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/1270

SAVER: SNARK-friendly, Additively-homomorphic, and Verifiable Encryption and decryption with Rerandomization

Jiwon Lee and Jaekyoung Choi and Jihye Kim and Hyunok Oh

Abstract: In the pairing-based zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (zk-SNARK), there often exists a requirement for the proof system to be combined with encryption. As a typical example, a blockchain-based voting system requires the vote to be confidential (using encryption), while verifying voting validity (using zk-SNARKs). In these combined applications, a typical solution is to extend the zk-SNARK circuit to include the encryption code. However, complex cryptographic operations in the encryption algorithm increase the circuit size, which leads to impractically large proving time and CRS size.

In this paper, we propose SNARK-friendly, Additively-homomorphic, and Verifiable Encryption and decryption with Rerandomization or SAVER, which is a novel approach to detach the encryption from the SNARK circuit. The encryption in SAVER holds many useful properties. It is SNARK-friendly: the encryption is conjoined with an existing pairing-based SNARK, in a way that the encryptor can prove pre-defined properties while encrypting the message apart from the SNARK. It is additively-homomorphic: the ciphertext holds a homomorphic property from the ElGamal-based encryption. It is a verifiable encryption: one can verify arbitrary properties of encrypted messages by connecting with the SNARK system. It provides a verifiable decryption: anyone without the secret can still verify that the decrypted message is indeed from the given ciphertext. It provides rerandomization: the proof and the ciphertext can be rerandomized as independent objects so that even the encryptor (or prover) herself cannot identify the origin.

For the representative application, we also propose a Vote-SAVER based on SAVER, which is a novel voting system where voter's secret key lies only with the voter himself. The Vote-SAVER satisfies receipt-freeness (which implies ballot privacy), individual verifiability (which implies non-repudiation), vote verifiability, tally uniqueness, and voter anonymity. The experimental results show that our SAVER with respect to the Vote-SAVER relation yields 0.7s for zk-SNARK proving time and 10ms for encryption, with the CRS size of 16MB.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / pairing-based zk-SNARK, verifiable encryption, verifiable decryption, public-key encryption, additively-homomorphic encryption, rerandomization

Date: received 1 Nov 2019, last revised 29 Dec 2020

Contact author: jiwonlee at hanyang ac kr, cjk2889 at kookmin ac kr, jihyek at kookmin ac kr, hoh at hanyang ac kr

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20201229:101525 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/1270


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]