Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/1270

SAVER: Snark-friendly, Additively-homomorphic, and Verifiable Encryption and decryption with Rerandomization

Jiwon Lee and Jaekyoung Choi and Jihye Kim and Hyunok Oh

Abstract: In the pairing-based zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (zk-SNARK), there often exists a requirement for the proof system to be combined with encryption. As a typical example, a blockchain-based voting system requires the vote to be confidential (using encryption), while verifying voting validity (using zk-SNARKs). In this kind of combined applications, a general solution is to extend the zk-SNARK circuit to include the encryption code. However, complex cryptographic operations in the encryption algorithm increase the circuit size, which leads to impractically large proving time and the CRS size.

In this paper, we propose Snark-friendly, Additively-homomorphic, and Verifiable Encryption and decryption with Rerandomization or the SAVER, which is a novel approach to detach the encryption from the SNARK circuit. The encryption in SAVER holds many useful properties. It is SNARK-friendly: the encryption is conjoined with an existing pairing-based SNARK, in a way that the encryptor can prove pre-defined properties while encrypting the message apart from the SNARK. It is additively-homomorphic: the ciphertext holds a homomorphic property from the ElGamal-based encryption. It is verifiable encryption: one can verify arbitrary properties of encrypted messages by connecting with the SNARK system. It provides verifiable decryption: anyone without the secret can still verify that the decrypted message is indeed from the given ciphertext. It provides rerandomization: the proof and the ciphertext can be rerandomized as independent objects so that even the encryptor (or prover) herself cannot identify the origin.

For the representative application, we define and construct a voting system scenario and explain the necessity of each property in the SAVER. We prove the IND-CPA-security of the encryption, along with the soundness of encryption and decryption proofs. The experimental results show that the voting system designed from our SAVER yields 0.7s proving/encryption (voting) time, and 16MB-sized CRS for SNARK regardless of the message size.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / pairing-based zk-SNARK, verifiable encryption, verifiable decryption, public-key encryption, additively-homomorphic encryption, rerandomization

Date: received 1 Nov 2019, last revised 5 Nov 2019

Contact author: jiwonlee at hanyang ac kr,cjk2889@kookmin ac kr,jihyek@kookmin ac kr,hoh@hanyang ac kr

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20191106:015656 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/1270


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