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Paper 2019/1255

Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Set Membership: Efficient, Succinct, Modular

Daniel Benarroch and Matteo Campanelli and Dario Fiore and Kobi Gurkan and Dimitris Kolonelos

Abstract

We consider the problem of proving in zero-knowledge that an element of a public set satisfies a given property without disclosing the element, i.e., for some $u$, ``$u \in S$ and $P(u)$ holds''. This problem arises in many applications (anonymous cryptocurrencies, credentials or whitelists) where, for privacy or anonymity reasons, it is crucial to hide certain data while ensuring properties of such data. We design new modular and efficient constructions for this problem through new commit-and-prove zero-knowledge systems for set membership, i.e. schemes proving $u \in S$ for a value $u$ that is in a public commitment $c_u$. We also extend our results to support non-membership proofs, i.e. proving $u \notin S$. Being commit-and-prove, our solutions can act as plug-and-play modules in statements of the form ``$u \in S$ and $P(u)$ holds'' by combining our set (non-)membership systems with any other commit-and-prove scheme for $P(u)$. Also, they work with Pedersen commitments over prime order groups which makes them compatible with popular systems such as Bulletproofs or Groth16. We implemented our schemes as a software library, and tested experimentally their performance. Compared to previous work that achieves similar properties---the clever techniques combining zkSNARKs and Merkle Trees in Zcash---our solutions offer more flexibility, shorter public parameters and $4.7 \times$--$42\times$ faster proving time for a set of size $2^{64}$.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
public-key cryptographyzero knowledgeapplications
Contact author(s)
matteo campanelli @ gmail com
History
2023-12-22: last of 5 revisions
2019-10-28: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/1255
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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