Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/1236

Single-Trace Vulnerability of Countermeasures against Instruction-related Timing Attack

Bo-Yeon Sim and Dong-Guk Han

Abstract: In this paper, we propose that countermeasures against instruction-related timing attack would be vulnerable to single-trace attacks, which are presented at ISPEC 2017 and CHES 2019. The countermeasures use determiner to make operations, which leak timing side-channel information, perform in a constant-time. Since determiner is divided into two groups according to secret credentials, it is possible to recover secret credentials by clustering determiner into two groups.

Category / Keywords: applications / Side-Channe Attacks, Timing Attack Countermeasures, Single-Trace Attack, Clustering

Date: received 22 Oct 2019

Contact author: qjdusls at kookmin ac kr,christa@kookmin ac kr

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20191023:084318 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/1236


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