Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/1203

Authentication in Key-Exchange: Definitions, Relations and Composition

Cyprien Delpech de Saint Guilhem and Marc Fischlin and Bogdan Warinschi

Abstract: We present a systematic approach to define and study authentication notions in authenticated key-exchange protocols. We propose and use a flexible and expressive predicate-based definitional framework. Our definitions capture key and entity authentication, in both implicit and explicit variants, as well as key and entity confirmation, for authenticated key-exchange protocols. In particular, we capture critical notions in the authentication space such as key-compromise impersonation resistance and security against unknown key-share attacks. We first present and explore these definitions within the Bellare-Rogaway model and then extend them to Canetti-Krawczyk-style models.

We then show two useful applications of our framework. First, we look at the authentication guarantees of three representative protocols to draw several useful lessons for protocol design. The core technical contribution of this paper is then to formally establish that composition of secure implicitly authenticated key-exchange with subsequent confirmation protocols yields explicit authentication guarantees. Without a formal separation of implicit and explicit authentication from secrecy, a proof of this folklore result could not have been established.

Category / Keywords: foundations / key-exchange, authentication, composition

Original Publication (with major differences): 2020 IEEE 33rd Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2020

Date: received 14 Oct 2019, last revised 29 Jan 2021

Contact author: cyprien delpechdesaintguilhem at kuleuven be, marc fischlin at cryptoplexity de, bogdan at cs bris ac uk

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20210129:151928 (All versions of this report)

Short URL:

[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]