Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/1198

Encrypted Databases: New Volume Attacks against Range Queries

Zichen Gui and Oliver Johnson and Bogdan Warinschi

Abstract: We present a range of novel attacks which exploit information about the volume of answers to range queries in encrypted database. Our attacks rely on a strategy which is simple yet robust and effective. We illustrate the robustness of our strategy in a number of ways. We show how i) to adapt the attack for several variations of a basic usage scenario ii) to defeat countermeasures intended to thwart the premise of our basic attack and iii) to perform partial reconstruction of secret data when unique reconstruction is information theoretically impossible. Furthermore, over the state of the art, our attacks require one order of magnitude fewer queries. We show how to improve the attacks even further, under the assumption that some partial information is known to the adversary. We validate experimentally all of our attacks through extensive experiments on real-world medical data and justify theoretically the effectiveness of our strategy for the basic attack scenario. Our new attacks further underscore the difficulty of striking an appropriate functionality-security trade-off for encrypted databases.

Category / Keywords: applications / Encrypted databases, volume leakage attacks

Original Publication (with minor differences): ACM CCS 2019
DOI:
10.1145/3319535.3363210

Date: received 14 Oct 2019

Contact author: zg13988 at bristol ac uk,o johnson@bristol ac uk,csxbw@bristol ac uk

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20191015:074913 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/1198


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