Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/118

Defeating the Hart, Kim, Micheli, Pascuel-Perez, Petit, Quek Attack on WalnutDSA(TM)

Iris Anshel and Derek Atkins and Dorian Goldfeld and Paul E Gunnells

Abstract: The Walnut Digital Signature Algorithm (WalnutDSA) is a group-theoretic, public-key method that is part of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization process. Prior to its submission to NIST, Hart et al published an attack that, when it produces a signature forgery, it is found to be orders of magnitude longer than a valid signature making it invalid due to its length. In addition to being identified as a forgery by our current method, we show that with a modest parameter-only increase we can block this attack to the desired security level without a significant impact on the performance while making WalnutDSA completely secure against this attack.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography /

Date: received 5 Feb 2019, last revised 7 Feb 2019, withdrawn 8 May 2019

Contact author: datkins at securerf com, ianshel at securerf com, dgoldfeld at securerf com

Available format(s): (-- withdrawn --)

Version: 20190508:191545 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/118