Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/1150

The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol Against Quantum Adversaries

Alexandru Cojocaru and Juan Garay and Aggelos Kiayias and Fang Song and Petros Wallden

Abstract: Bitcoin and its underlying blockchain protocol have received recently significant attention in the context of building distributed systems as well as from the perspective of the foundations of the consensus problem. At the same time, the rapid development of quantum technologies brings the possibility of quantum computing devices from a theoretical concept to an emerging technology. Motivated by this, in this work we revisit the formal security of the core of the Bitcoin protocol, called the Bitcoin backbone, under the assumption that the adversary has access to a scalable quantum computer. We prove that the protocol's essential properties stand in the post-quantum setting assuming a suitably bounded Quantum adversary in the Quantum Random Oracle (QRO) model. Specifically, our results imply that security can be shown by bounding the quantum queries so that each quantum query is worth $O(p^{-1/2})$ classical ones and that the wait time for safe settlement is expanded by a multiplicative factor of $O(p^{-1/6})$, where $p$ is the probability of success of a single classical query to the protocol's underlying hash function.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Blockchain, Post-Quantum, Quantum Random Oracle

Date: received 3 Oct 2019, last revised 3 Oct 2019

Contact author: a d cojocaru at sms ed ac uk,juan a garay@gmail com,akiayias@inf ed ac uk,fang song@tamu edu,petros wallden@ed ac uk

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20191007:082159 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/1150


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