A Provably Secure Conditional Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme without Pairing

Arinjita Paul; S.  Sharmila Deva Selvi; C.  Pandu Rangan

Paper 2019/1135

A Provably Secure Conditional Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme without Pairing

Arinjita Paul, S. Sharmila Deva Selvi, and C. Pandu Rangan

Abstract

Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss introduced the notion of proxy re-encryption (PRE), which enables a semi-trusted proxy to transform ciphertexts under Alice's public key into ciphertexts under Bob's public key. The important property to note here is, the proxy should not learn anything about the plaintext encrypted. In 2009, Weng et al. introduced the concept of conditional proxy re-encryption (CPRE), which permits the proxy to re-encrypt only ciphertexts satisfying a condition specified by Alice into a ciphertext for Bob. CPRE enables fine-grained delegation of decryption rights useful in many practical scenarios, such as blockchain-enabled distributed cloud storage and encrypted email forwarding. Several CPRE schemes exist in the literature based on costly bilinear pairing operation in the random oracle model. We propose the first construction of an efficient CPRE scheme without pairing, satisfying chosen ciphertext security under the computational Diffie Hellman (CDH) assumption and its variant in the random oracle model.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
Keywords: Proxy Re-Encryption Public Key Conditional Pairing-less Unidirectional Single hop CCA-secure
Contact author(s): arinjita paul @ gmail com
History: 2019-10-03: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2019/1135
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/1135,
      author = {Arinjita Paul and S.  Sharmila Deva Selvi and C.  Pandu Rangan},
      title = {A Provably Secure Conditional Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme without Pairing},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/1135},
      year = {2019},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1135}
}