Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/086

Reinterpreting and Improving the Cryptanalysis of the Flash Player PRNG

George Teseleanu

Abstract: Constant blinding is an efficient countermeasure against just-in-time (JIT) spraying attacks. Unfortunately, this mitigation mechanism is not always implemented correctly. One such example is the constant blinding mechanism found in the Adobe Flash Player. Instead of choosing a strong mainstream pseudo-random number generator (PRNG), the Flash Player designers chose to implement a proprietary one. This led to the discovery of a vulnerability that can be exploited to recover the initial seed used by the PRNG and thus, to bypass the constant blinding mechanism. Using this vulnerability as a starting point, we show that no matter the parameters used by the previously mentioned PRNG it still remains a weak construction. A consequence of this study is an improvement of the seed recovering mechanism from previously known complexity of $\mathcal O(2^{21})$ to one of $\mathcal O(2^{11})$.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / jit spaying attacks, flash player prng, constant blinding

Original Publication (with minor differences): C2SI-2019

Date: received 26 Jan 2019

Contact author: george teseleanu at yahoo com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190128:164112 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/086


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