Paper 2019/085
The Lattice-Based Digital Signature Scheme qTESLA
Erdem Alkim, Paulo S. L. M. Barreto, Nina Bindel, Juliane Kramer, Patrick Longa, and Jefferson E. Ricardini
Abstract
We present qTESLA, a family of post-quantum digital signature schemes that exhibits several attractive features such as simplicity and strong security guarantees against quantum adversaries, and built-in protection against certain side-channel and fault attacks. qTESLA---selected for round 2 of NIST's post-quantum cryptography standardization project---consolidates a series of recent schemes originating in works by Lyubashevsky, and Bai and Galbraith. We provide full-fledged, constant-time portable C implementations that showcase the code compactness of the proposed scheme, e.g., our code requires only about 300 lines of C code. Finally, we also provide AVX2-optimized assembly implementations that achieve a factor-1.5 speedup.
Note: This version does not contain heuristic parameter sets, which were removed due to security reasons. The paper includes portable C and AVX2-optimized implementations of provably-secure parameter sets, and a countermeasure to protect against key substitution (KS) attacks, which improves security in the multi-user setting.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Major revision. ACNS 2020
- Keywords
- Post-quantum cryptographylattice-based cryptographydigital signaturesprovable securityefficient implementation.
- Contact author(s)
-
nlbindel @ uwaterloo ca
plonga @ microsoft com - History
- 2020-04-24: last of 4 revisions
- 2019-01-28: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/085
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/085, author = {Erdem Alkim and Paulo S. L. M. Barreto and Nina Bindel and Juliane Kramer and Patrick Longa and Jefferson E. Ricardini}, title = {The Lattice-Based Digital Signature Scheme {qTESLA}}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/085}, year = {2019}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/085} }