Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/073

Destructive Privacy and Mutual Authentication in Vaudenay's RFID Model

Cristian Hristea and Ferucio Laurentiu Tiplea

Abstract: With the large scale adoption of the Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology, a variety of security and privacy risks need to be addressed. Arguably, the most general and used RFID security and privacy model is the one proposed by Vaudenay. It considers concurrency, corruption (with or without destruction) of tags, and the possibility to get the result of a protocol session on the reader side. Security in Vaudenay's model embraces two forms, unilateral (tag) authentication and mutual (tag and reader) authentication, while privacy is very flexible and dependent on the adversary class. The construction of destructive private RFID schemes in Vaudenay's model was left open when the model was initially proposed. It was solved three years later in the context of unilateral authentication.

In this paper we propose a destructive private and mutual authentication RFID scheme in Vaudenay's model. The security and privacy of our scheme are rigorously proved. We also show that the only two RFID schemes proposed so far that claimed to achieve destructive privacy and mutual authentication are not even narrow forward private. Thus, our RIFD scheme is the first one to achieve this kind of privacy and security. The paper also points out some privacy proof flaws that have been met in previous constructions.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / RFID scheme, security, privacy

Date: received 21 Jan 2019

Contact author: cristi hristea at gmail com,fltiplea@gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190125:221434 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/073


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