Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/069

Quantum Indistinguishability of Random Sponges

Jan Czajkowski and Andreas Hülsing and Christian Schaffner

Abstract: In this work we show that the sponge construction can be used to construct quantum-secure pseudorandom functions. As our main result we prove that random sponges are quantum indistinguishable from random functions. In this setting the adversary is given superposition access to the input-output behavior of the construction but not to the internal function. Our proofs hold under the assumption that the internal function is a random function or permutation. We then use this result to obtain a quantum-security version of a result by Andreeva, Daemen, Mennink, and Van Assche (FSE'15) which shows that a sponge that uses a secure PRP or PRF as internal function is a secure PRF. This result also proves that the recent attacks against CBC-MAC in the quantum-access model by Kaplan, Leurent, Leverrier, and Naya-Plasencia (Crypto'16) and Santoli, and Schaffner (QIC'16) can be prevented by introducing a state with a non-trivial inner part.

The proof of our main result is derived by analyzing the joint distribution of any $q$ input-output pairs. Our method analyzes the statistical behavior of the considered construction in great detail. The used techniques might prove useful in future analysis of different cryptographic primitives considering quantum adversaries. Using Zhandry's PRF/PRP switching lemma we then obtain that quantum indistinguishability also holds if the internal block function is a random permutation.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / Symmetric cryptography, keyed sponges, indistinguishability, quantum security, message-authentication codes

Date: received 21 Jan 2019

Contact author: j czajkowski at uva nl, andreas@huelsing net, c schaffner@uva nl

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190125:220706 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/069


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