Paper 2019/061
SigAttack: New High-level SAT-based Attack on Logic Encryptions
Yuanqi Shen, You Li, Shuyu Kong, Amin Rezaei, and Hai Zhou
Abstract
Logic encryption is a powerful hardware protection technique that uses extra key inputs to lock a circuit from piracy or unauthorized use. The recent discovery of the SAT-based attack with Distinguishing Input Pattern (DIP) generation has rendered all traditional logic encryptions vulnerable, and thus the creation of new encryption methods. However, a critical question for any new encryption method is whether security against the DIP-generation attack means security against all other attacks. In this paper, a new high-level SAT-based attack called SigAttack has been discovered and thoroughly investigated. It is based on extracting a key-revealing signature in the encryption. A majority of all known SAT-resilient encryptions are shown to be vulnerable to SigAttack. By formulating the condition under which SigAttack is effective, the paper also provides guidance for the future logic encryption design.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- logic encryptionattackSAT
- Contact author(s)
- haizhou @ northwestern edu
- History
- 2019-01-25: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/061
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/061,
author = {Yuanqi Shen and You Li and Shuyu Kong and Amin Rezaei and Hai Zhou},
title = {{SigAttack}: New High-level {SAT}-based Attack on Logic Encryptions},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/061},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/061}
}
