Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/061

SigAttack: New High-level SAT-based Attack on Logic Encryptions

Yuanqi Shen and You Li and Shuyu Kong and Amin Rezaei and Hai Zhou

Abstract: Logic encryption is a powerful hardware protection technique that uses extra key inputs to lock a circuit from piracy or unauthorized use. The recent discovery of the SAT-based attack with Distinguishing Input Pattern (DIP) generation has rendered all traditional logic encryptions vulnerable, and thus the creation of new encryption methods. However, a critical question for any new encryption method is whether security against the DIP-generation attack means security against all other attacks. In this paper, a new high-level SAT-based attack called SigAttack has been discovered and thoroughly investigated. It is based on extracting a key-revealing signature in the encryption. A majority of all known SAT-resilient encryptions are shown to be vulnerable to SigAttack. By formulating the condition under which SigAttack is effective, the paper also provides guidance for the future logic encryption design.

Category / Keywords: applications / logic encryption, attack, SAT

Date: received 18 Jan 2019

Contact author: haizhou at northwestern edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190125:215827 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/061


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