### Rate-Optimizing Compilers for Continuously Non-Malleable Codes

Sandro Coretti, Antonio Faonio, and Daniele Venturi

##### Abstract

We study the *rate* of so-called *continuously* non-malleable codes, which allow to encode a message in such a way that (possibly adaptive) continuous tampering attacks on the codeword yield a decoded value that is unrelated to the original message. Our results are as follows: -) For the case of bit-wise independent tampering, we establish the existence of rate-one continuously non-malleable codes with information-theoretic security, in the plain model. -) For the case of split-state tampering, we establish the existence of rate-one continuously non-malleable codes with computational security, in the (non-programmable) random oracle model. We further exhibit a rate-1/2 code and a rate-one code in the common reference string model, but the latter only withstands *non-adaptive* tampering. It is well known that computational security is inherent for achieving continuous non-malleability in the split-state model (even in the presence of non-adaptive tampering). Continuously non-malleable codes are useful for protecting *arbitrary* cryptographic primitives against related-key attacks, as well as for constructing non-malleable public-key encryption schemes. Our results directly improve the efficiency of these applications.

Available format(s)
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
non-malleable codestamper-proof security
Contact author(s)
corettis @ nyu edu
antonio faonio @ imdea org
venturi @ di uniroma1 it
History
2019-01-29: revised
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/055

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/055,
author = {Sandro Coretti and Antonio Faonio and Daniele Venturi},
title = {Rate-Optimizing Compilers for Continuously Non-Malleable Codes},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/055},
year = {2019},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/055}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/055}
}

Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.