Paper 2019/045

Leakage-resilient Identity-based Encryption in Bounded Retrieval Model with Nearly Optimal Leakage-Ratio

Ryo Nishimaki and Takashi Yamakawa

Abstract

We propose new constructions of leakage-resilient public-key encryption (PKE) and identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes in the bounded retrieval model (BRM). In the BRM, adversaries are allowed to obtain at most $\ell$-bit leakage from a secret key and we can increase $\ell$ only by increasing the size of secret keys without losing efficiency in any other performance measure. We call $\ell /|\mathsf{\text{sk}}|$ leakage-ratio where $|\mathsf{\text{sk}}|$ denotes a bit-length of a secret key. Several PKE/IBE schemes in the BRM are known. However, none of these constructions achieve a constant leakage-ratio under a standard assumption in the standard model. Our PKE/IBE schemes are the first schemes in the BRM that achieve leakage-ratio $1-ϵ$ for any constant $ϵ>0$ under standard assumptions in the standard model. As previous works, we use identity-based hash proof systems (IB-HPS) to construct IBE schemes in the BRM. It is known that a parameter for IB-HPS called the universality-ratio is translated into the leakage-ratio of the resulting IBE scheme in the BRM. We construct an IB-HPS with universality-ratio $$ for any constant $$ based on any inner-product predicate encryption (IPE) scheme with compact secret keys. Such IPE schemes exist under the $$-linear, subgroup decision, learning with errors, or computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumptions. As a result, we obtain IBE schemes in the BRM with leakage-ratio $$ under any of these assumptions. Our PKE schemes are immediately obtained from our IBE schemes.