Paper 2019/029

Upper Bound on $\lambda_1(\Lambda^{\bot}(\mathbf A))$

Huiwen Jia, Chunming Tang, and Yanhua Zhang


It has been shown that, for appropriate parameters, solving the $\mathsf{SIS}$ problem in the average case is at least as hard as approximating certain lattice problems in the worst case %on any $n$-dimensional lattice to within polynomial factor $\beta\cdot\widetilde{O}(\sqrt n)$, where typically $\beta=O(\sqrt{n\log n})$ such that random $\mathsf{SIS}$ instances admit a solution. In this work, we show that $\beta=O(1)$, i.e., $\beta$ is essentially upper-bounded by a constant. This directly gives us a poly-time exhaustive search algorithm for solving the $\mathsf{SIS}$ problem (resulting in approximating certain worst-case lattice problems to within $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt n)$ factor). Although the exhaustive search algorithm is rather inefficient for typical setting of parameters, our result indicates that lattice-based cryptography is not secure, at least in an asymptotical sense. Our work is based on an observation of the lower/upper bounds on the smoothing parameter for lattices.

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-- withdrawn --
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
security of lattice-based cryptographyshortest vector problemworst-castaverage-case reductionthe smoothing parameter
Contact author(s)
hwjia @ gzhu edu cn
2019-01-23: withdrawn
2019-01-15: received
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