Paper 2019/026

Non-malleable encryption with proofs of plaintext knowledge and applications to voting

Ben Smyth and Yoshikazu Hanatani

Abstract

Non-malleable asymmetric encryption schemes which prove plaintext knowledge are sufficient for secrecy in some domains. For example, ballot secrecy in voting. In these domains, some applications derive encryption schemes by coupling malleable ciphertexts with proofs of plaintext knowledge, without evidence that the sufficient condition (for secrecy) is satisfied nor an independent security proof (of secrecy). Consequently, it is unknown whether these applications satisfy desirable secrecy properties. In this article, we propose a generic construction for such a coupling and show that our construction produces non-malleable encryption schemes which prove plaintext knowledge. Furthermore, we show how our results can be used to prove ballot secrecy of voting systems. Accordingly, we facilitate the development of applications satisfying their security objectives.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
anonymityapplicationselection schemesfoundationsimplementationmalleabilitynon-malleabilityprivacypublic-key cryptographysecrecyzero knowledge
Contact author(s)
toshiba @ bensmyth com
History
2019-01-15: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/026
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/026,
      author = {Ben Smyth and Yoshikazu Hanatani},
      title = {Non-malleable encryption with proofs of plaintext knowledge and applications to voting},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/026},
      year = {2019},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/026}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/026}
}
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