Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/024

A publicly verifiable quantum signature scheme based on asymmetric quantum cryptography

Yalin Chen and Jue-Sam Chou and Fang-Qi Zhou

Abstract: In 2018, Shi et al. 's showed that Kaushik et al.'s quantum signature scheme is defective. It suffers from the forgery attack. They further proposed an improvement, trying to avoid the attack. However, after examining we found their improved quantum signature is deniable, because the verifier can impersonate the signer to sign a message. After that, when a dispute occurs, he can argue that the signature was not signed by him. It was from the signer. To overcome the drawback, in this paper, we raise an improvement to make it publicly verifiable and hence more suitable to be applied in real life. After cryptanalysis, we confirm that our improvement not only resist the forgery attack but also is undeniable.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / Undeniable quantum signature scheme, Impersonation attack, Quantum asymmetric cryptography, Trapdoor one-way function, Single-qubit rotations encryption, Publicly verifiable signature

Date: received 9 Jan 2019

Contact author: jschou at nhu edu tw

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190115:192151 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/024


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