Paper 2019/024

A publicly verifiable quantum signature scheme based on asymmetric quantum cryptography

Yalin Chen, Jue-Sam Chou, Fang-Qi Zhou, and Shu-Mei Hsu


In 2018, Shi et al. 's showed that Kaushik et al.'s quantum signature scheme is defective. It suffers from the forgery attack. They further proposed an improvement, trying to avoid the attack. However, after examining we found their improved quantum signature is deniable, because the verifier can impersonate the signer to sign a message. After that, when a dispute occurs, he can argue that the signature was not signed by him. It was from the signer. To overcome the drawback, in this paper, we raise an improvement to make it publicly verifiable and hence more suitable to be applied in real life. After cryptanalysis, we confirm that our improvement not only resist the forgery attack but also is undeniable.

Available format(s)
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Undeniable quantum signature schemeImpersonation attackQuantum asymmetric cryptographyTrapdoor one-way functionSingle-qubit rotations encryptionPublicly verifiable signature
Contact author(s)
jschou @ nhu edu tw
2019-12-19: last of 7 revisions
2019-01-15: received
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Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Yalin Chen and Jue-Sam Chou and Fang-Qi Zhou and Shu-Mei Hsu},
      title = {A publicly verifiable quantum signature scheme based on asymmetric quantum cryptography},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/024},
      year = {2019},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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