Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/004

On the Bright Side of Darkness: Side-Channel Based Authentication Protocol Against Relay Attacks

Guillaume Dabosville and Houssem Maghrebi and Alexis Lhuillery and Julien Bringer and Thanh-Ha Le

Abstract: Relay attacks are nowadays well known and most designers of secure authentication protocols are aware of them. At present, the main methods to prevent these attacks are based on the so-called distance bounding technique which consists in measuring the round-trip time of the exchanged authentication messages between the prover and the verifier to estimate an upper bound on the distance between these entities. Based on this bound, the verifier checks if the prover is sufficiently close by to rule out an unauthorized entity. Recently, a new work has proposed an authentication protocol that surprisingly uses the side-channel leakage to prevent relay attacks. In this paper, we exhibit some practical and security issues of this protocol and provide a new one that fixes all of them. Then, we argue the resistance of our proposal against both side-channel and relay attacks under some realistic assumptions. Our experimental results show the efficiency of our protocol in terms of false acceptance and false rejection rates.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / authentication protocol, relay attacks, side-channel attacks, physical leakage

Date: received 31 Dec 2018, last revised 16 Jan 2019

Contact author: guillaume dabosville at gmail com,houssem mag@gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190116:193900 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/004


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