Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/003

Secure and Effective Logic Locking for Machine Learning Applications

Yuntao Liu and Yang Xie and Abhishek Charkraborty and Ankur Srivastava

Abstract: Logic locking has been proposed as a strong protection of intellectual property (IP) against security threats in the IC supply chain especially when the fabrication facility is untrusted. Various techniques have proposed circuit configurations which do not allow the untrusted fab to decipher the true functionality and/or produce usable versions of the chip without having access to the locking key. These techniques rely on using additional locking circuitry which injects incorrect behavior into the digital functionality when the key is incorrect. However, much of this conventional research focuses on locking individual modules (such as adders, ALUs etc.). While locking these modules is useful, the true test for any locking scheme should consider their impact on the application running on a processor with such modules. A locked module within a processor may or may not have a substantial impact at the application level thereby allowing the attacker (untrusted foundry or unauthorized user) to still get useful work out of the system despite not having access to the key details. In this work, we show that even when state of the art locking schemes are used to lock the modules within a processor, a large class of workloads derived from machine learning (ML) applications (which are increasingly becoming the most relevant ones) continue to function correctly. This has huge implications to the effectiveness of the current locking techniques. The main reason for this behavior is the inherent error resiliency of such applications. To counter this threat, we propose a novel secure and effective logic locking scheme, called Strong Anti-SAT (SAS), to lock the entire processor and make sure that the ML applications undergo significant accuracy loss when any wrong key is applied. We provide two types of SAS, namely SAS-A and SAS-B. Experiments show that, for both types of SAS, 1) the application-level accuracy loss is significant (for ML applications) given any wrong key, 2) the attacker needs extremely long time to find a correct key, and 3) the hardware overhead is very small. Lastly, even though our techniques target machine learning type application workloads, the impact on conventional workloads will also be similar. Due to the inherent error resilience of ML, locking ML workloads is a harder problem to tackle.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / Logic Locking, SAT Attack, Machine Learning Applications, Strong Anti-SAT

Date: received 30 Dec 2018, last revised 8 Jan 2019

Contact author: ytliu at umd edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190109:003751 (All versions of this report)

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