Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/978

Encrypted Multi-Maps with Computationally-Secure Leakage

Seny Kamara and Tarik Moataz

Abstract: We initiate the study of structured encryption schemes with computationally-secure leakage. Specifically, we focus on the design of volume-hiding encrypted multi-maps; that is, of encrypted multi-maps that hide the response length to computationally-bounded adversaries. We describe the first volume-hiding STE schemes that do not rely on naive padding; that is, padding all tuples to the same length. Our first construction has efficient query complexity and storage but can be lossy. We show, however, that the information loss can be bounded with overwhelming probability for a large class of multi-maps (i.e., with lengths distributed according to a Zipf distribution). Our second construction is not lossy and can achieve storage overhead that is asymptotically better than naive padding for Zipf-distributed multi-maps. We also show how to further improve the storage when the multi-map is highly concentrated in the sense that it has a large number of tuples with a large intersection.

We achieve these results by leveraging computational assumptions. Not just for encryption but, more interestingly, to hide the volumes themselves. Our first construction achieves this using a pseudo-random function whereas our second construction achieves this by relying on the conjectured hardness of the planted densest subgraph problem which is a planted variant of the well-studied densest subgraph problem. This assumption was previously used to design public-key encryptions schemes (Applebaum et al., STOC '10) and to study the computational complexity of financial products (Arora et al., ICS '10).

Category / Keywords: structured encryption, searchable symmetric encryption, leakage

Date: received 12 Oct 2018

Contact author: tarik_moataz at brown edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20181015:122109 (All versions of this report)

Short URL:

[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]