### Protean Signature Schemes

Stephan Krenn, Henrich C. Pöhls, Kai Samelin, and Daniel Slamanig

##### Abstract

We introduce the notion of Protean Signature schemes. This novel type of signature scheme allows to remove and edit signer-chosen parts of signed messages by a semi-trusted third party simultaneously. In existing work, one is either allowed to remove or edit parts of signed messages, but not both at the same time. Which and how parts of the signed messages can be modified is chosen by the signer. Thus, our new primitive generalizes both redactable (Steinfeld et al., ICISC '01, Johnson et al., CT-RSA '02 & Brzuska et al., ACNS'10) and sanitizable signatures schemes (Ateniese et al., ESORICS '05 & Brzuska et al., PKC'09). We showcase a scenario where either primitive alone is not sufficient. Our provably secure construction (offering both strong notions of transparency and invisibility) makes only black-box access to sanitizable and redactable signature schemes, which can be considered standard tools nowadays. Finally, we have implemented our scheme; Our evaluation shows that the performance is reasonable.

Note: Contains additional definitions and all proofs.

Available format(s)
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. MAJOR revision.CANS 2018
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-00434-7_13
Contact author(s)
kaispapers @ gmail com
History
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/970

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/970,
author = {Stephan Krenn and Henrich C.  Pöhls and Kai Samelin and Daniel Slamanig},
title = {Protean Signature Schemes},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/970},
year = {2018},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-00434-7_13},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/970}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/970}
}

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