Paper 2018/960

Towards Quantum One-Time Memories from Stateless Hardware

Anne Broadbent, Sevag Gharibian, and Hong-Sheng Zhou


A central tenet of theoretical cryptography is the study of the minimal assumptions re- quired to implement a given cryptographic primitive. One such primitive is the one-time memory (OTM), introduced by Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum [CRYPTO 2008], which is a classical functionality modeled after a non-interactive 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, and which is complete for one-time classical and quantum programs. It is known that secure OTMs do not exist in the standard model in both the classical and quantum settings. Here, we propose a scheme for using quantum information, together with the assumption of stateless (i.e., reusable) hardware tokens, to build statistically secure OTMs. Via the semidefinite programming-based quantum games framework of Gutoski and Watrous [STOC 2007], we prove security for a malicious receiver, against a linear number of adaptive queries to the token, in the quantum universal composability framework. We prove stand-alone security against a malicious sender, but leave open the question of composable security against a malicious sender, as well as security against a malicious receiver making a polynomial number of adaptive queries. Compared to alternative schemes derived from the literature on quantum money, our scheme is technologically simple since it is of the “prepare-and-measure” type. We also show our scheme is “tight” according to two scenarios.

Note: This replaces the previously withdrawn paper (eprint report 2015/1072).

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Quantum cryptography
Contact author(s)
hongsheng zhou @ gmail com
2018-10-14: received
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Anne Broadbent and Sevag Gharibian and Hong-Sheng Zhou},
      title = {Towards Quantum One-Time Memories from Stateless Hardware},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/960},
      year = {2018},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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