Paper 2018/928
Generic Authenticated Key Exchange in the Quantum Random Oracle Model
Kathrin Hövelmanns, Eike Kiltz, Sven Schäge, and Dominique Unruh
Abstract
We propose FO-AKE a generic construction of two-message authenticated key exchange (AKE) from any passively secure public key encryption (PKE) in the quantum random oracle model (QROM). Whereas previous AKE constructions relied on a Diffie-Hellman key exchange or required the underlying PKE scheme to be perfectly correct, our transformation allows arbitrary PKE schemes with non-perfect correctness. Furthermore, we avoid the use of (quantum-secure) digital signature schemes which are considerably less efficient than their PKE counterparts. As a consequence, we can instantiate our AKE transformation with any of the submissions to the recent NIST post-quantum competition, e.g., ones based on codes and lattices. FO-AKE can be seen as a generalization of the well known Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation (for building actively secure PKE from passively secure PKE) to the AKE setting. Therefore, as a helper result, we also provide a security proof for the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation in the QROM for PKE with non-perfect correctness. Our reduction fixes several gaps in a previous proof (CRYPTO 2018), is tighter, and tolerates a larger correctness error.
Note: Added missing acknowledgments
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in PKC 2020
- Keywords
- Authenticated key exchangequantum random oracle modelNISTFujisaki- Okamoto.
- Contact author(s)
-
Kathrin Hoevelmanns @ ruhr-uni-bochum de
sschaege @ googlemail com
eike kiltz @ rub de
unruh @ ut ee - History
- 2020-01-29: last of 6 revisions
- 2018-10-02: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/928
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/928,
author = {Kathrin Hövelmanns and Eike Kiltz and Sven Schäge and Dominique Unruh},
title = {Generic Authenticated Key Exchange in the Quantum Random Oracle Model},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/928},
year = {2018},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/928}
}
