Paper 2018/892

OptORAMa: Optimal Oblivious RAM

Gilad Asharov, Ilan Komargodski, Wei-Kai Lin, Kartik Nayak, Enoch Peserico, and Elaine Shi

Abstract

Oblivious RAM (ORAM), first introduced in the ground-breaking work of Goldreich and Ostrovsky (STOC '87 and J. ACM '96) is a technique for provably obfuscating programs' access patterns, such that the access patterns leak no information about the programs' secret inputs. To compile a general program to an oblivious counterpart, it is well-known that $\mathrm{\Omega }(\log N)$ amortized blowup is necessary, where $N$ is the size of the logical memory. This was shown in Goldreich and Ostrovksy's original ORAM work for statistical security and in a somewhat restricted model (the so called balls-and-bins model), and recently by Larsen and Nielsen (CRYPTO '18) for computational security. A long standing open question is whether there exists an optimal ORAM construction that matches the aforementioned logarithmic lower bounds (without making large memory word assumptions, and assuming a constant number of CPU registers). In this paper, we resolve this problem and present the first secure ORAM with $$ amortized blowup, assuming one-way functions. Our result is inspired by and non-trivially improves on the recent beautiful work of Patel et al. (FOCS '18) who gave a construction with $$ amortized blowup, assuming one-way functions. One of our building blocks of independent interest is a linear-time deterministic oblivious algorithm for tight compaction: Given an array of $$ elements where some elements are marked, we permute the elements in the array so that all marked elements end up in the front of the array. Our $$ algorithm improves the previously best known deterministic or randomized algorithms whose running time is $$ or $$, respectively.