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Paper 2018/886

Towards Isogeny-Based Password-Authenticated Key Establishment

Oleg Taraskin, Vladimir Soukharev, David Jao, and Jason LeGrow

Abstract

Password authenticated key establishment (PAKE) is a cryptographic primitive that allows two parties who share a low-entropy secret (a password) to securely establish cryptographic keys in the absence of public key infrastructure. We propose the first quantum-resistant password-authenticated key exchange scheme based on supersingular elliptic curve isogenies. The scheme is built upon supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman, and uses the password to generate permutations which obscure the auxiliary points. We include elements of a security proof, and discuss roadblocks to obtaining a proof in the BPR model. We also include some performance results.

Note: Revised to remove incorrect arguments. Includes performance results.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Mathcrypt 2019
Keywords
isogeny-based cryptographypassword-authenticated key establishment
Contact author(s)
jlegrow @ uwaterloo ca
History
2020-01-14: revised
2018-09-23: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/886
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/886,
      author = {Oleg Taraskin and Vladimir Soukharev and David Jao and Jason LeGrow},
      title = {Towards Isogeny-Based Password-Authenticated Key Establishment},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/886},
      year = {2018},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/886}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/886}
}
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