Paper 2018/883

Public Key Encryption Resilient to Post-Challenge Leakage and Tampering Attacks

Suvradip Chakraborty and C. Pandu Rangan


In this paper, we introduce a new framework for constructing public-key encryption (PKE) schemes resilient to joint post-challenge/after-the-fact leakage and tampering attacks in the bounded leakage and tampering (BLT) model, introduced by Damgård et al. (Asiacrypt 2013). All the prior formulations of PKE schemes considered leakage and tampering attacks only before the challenge ciphertext is made available to the adversary. However, this restriction seems necessary, since achieving security against post-challenge leakage and tampering attacks in its full generality is impossible as shown in previous works. In this paper, we study the post-challenge/after-the-fact security for PKE schemes against bounded leakage and tampering under a restricted yet meaningful and reasonable notion of security, namely, the split-state leakage and tampering model. We show that it is possible to construct secure PKE schemes in this model, tolerating arbitrary (but bounded) leakage and tampering queries; thus overcoming the previous impossibility results. To this end, we formulate a new notion of security, which we call entropic post-challenge IND-CCA-BLT secure PKE. We first define a weaker notion called entropic restricted post-challenge IND-CCA-BLT secure PKE, which can be instantiated using the (standard) DDH assumption. We then show a generic compiler from our entropic restricted notion to the entropic notion of security using a simulation-extractable non-interactive zero-knowledge argument system. This requires an untamperable common reference string as in previous works. Finally, we demonstrate the usefulness of our entropic notion of security by giving a simple and generic construction of post-challenge IND-CCA-BLT secure PKE scheme in the split-state leakage and tampering model. This also settles the open problem posed by Faonio and Venturi (Asiacrypt 2016).

Available format(s)
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
After-the-FactPost-challengeEntropic PKESplit-stateMemory TamperingRelated-Key AttacksBounded Leakage and Tampering
Contact author(s)
suvradip1111 @ gmail com
2018-09-23: received
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Suvradip Chakraborty and C.  Pandu Rangan},
      title = {Public Key Encryption Resilient to Post-Challenge Leakage and Tampering Attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/883},
      year = {2018},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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