Paper 2018/874

Enhanced Security of Attribute-Based Signatures

Johannes Blömer, Fabian Eidens, and Jakob Juhnke

Abstract

Despite the recent advances in attribute-based signatures (ABS), no schemes have yet been considered under a strong privacy definition. We enhance the security of ABS by presenting a strengthened simulation-based privacy definition and the first attribute-based signature functionality in the framework of universal composability (UC). Additionally, we show that the UC definition is equivalent to our strengthened experiment-based security definitions. To achieve this we rely on a general unforgeability and a simulation-based privacy definition that is stronger than standard indistinguishability-based privacy. Further, we show that two extant concrete ABS constructions satisfy this simulation-based privacy definition and are therefore UC secure. The two concrete constructions are the schemes by Sakai et al. (PKC'16) and by Maji et al. (CT-RSA'11). Additionally, we identify the common feature that allows these schemes to meet our privacy definition, giving us further insights into the security requirements of ABS.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. CANS 2018
Contact author(s)
feidens @ mail uni-paderborn de
History
2018-09-28: revised
2018-09-23: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/874
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/874,
      author = {Johannes Blömer and Fabian Eidens and Jakob Juhnke},
      title = {Enhanced Security of Attribute-Based Signatures},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/874},
      year = {2018},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/874}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/874}
}
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