Paper 2018/870

Unifying Kleptographic Attacks

George Teseleanu

Abstract

We present two simple backdoors that can be implemented into Maurer's unified zero-knowledge protocol. Thus, we show that a high level abstraction can replace individual backdoors embedded into protocols for proving knowledge of a discrete logarithm (e.g. the Schnorr and Girault protocols), protocols for proving knowledge of an $e^{th}$-root (e.g. the Fiat-Shamir and Guillou-Quisquater protocols), protocols for proving knowledge of a discrete logarithm representation (e.g. the Okamoto protocol) and protocols for proving knowledge of an $e^{th}$-root representation.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. MINOR revision.NordSec 2018
Keywords
zero knowledgesetup attackskleptographybackdoor
Contact author(s)
george teseleanu @ yahoo com
History
2022-03-15: revised
2018-09-23: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/870
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/870,
      author = {George Teseleanu},
      title = {Unifying Kleptographic Attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/870},
      year = {2018},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/870}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/870}
}
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