Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/870

Unifying Kleptographic Attacks

George Teseleanu

Abstract: We present two simple backdoors that can be implemented into Maurer's unified zero-knowledge protocol. Thus, we show that a high level abstraction can replace individual backdoors embedded into protocols for proving knowledge of a discrete logarithm (e.g. the Schnorr and Girault protocols), protocols for proving knowledge of an $e^{th}$-root (e.g. the Fiat-Shamir and Guillou-Quisquater protocols), protocols for proving knowledge of a discrete logarithm representation (e.g. the Okamoto protocol) and protocols for proving knowledge of an $e^{th}$-root representation.

Category / Keywords: zero knowledge, setup attacks, kleptography, backdoor

Original Publication (in the same form): NordSec 2018

Date: received 17 Sep 2018, last revised 21 Sep 2018

Contact author: george teseleanu at yahoo com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20180923:190922 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/870


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