Paper 2018/870
Unifying Kleptographic Attacks
George Teseleanu
Abstract
We present two simple backdoors that can be implemented into Maurer's unified zero-knowledge protocol. Thus, we show that a high level abstraction can replace individual backdoors embedded into protocols for proving knowledge of a discrete logarithm (e.g. the Schnorr and Girault protocols), protocols for proving knowledge of an $e^{th}$-root (e.g. the Fiat-Shamir and Guillou-Quisquater protocols), protocols for proving knowledge of a discrete logarithm representation (e.g. the Okamoto protocol) and protocols for proving knowledge of an $e^{th}$-root representation.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. NordSec 2018
- Keywords
- zero knowledgesetup attackskleptographybackdoor
- Contact author(s)
- george teseleanu @ yahoo com
- History
- 2022-03-15: revised
- 2018-09-23: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/870
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/870,
author = {George Teseleanu},
title = {Unifying Kleptographic Attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/870},
year = {2018},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/870}
}
