Attacking RO-PUFs with Enhanced Challenge-Response Pairs

Nils Wisiol; Marian Margraf

Paper 2018/862

Attacking RO-PUFs with Enhanced Challenge-Response Pairs

Nils Wisiol and Marian Margraf

Abstract

This paper studies the security of Ring Oscillator Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) with Enhanced Challenge-Response Pairs as proposed by Delavar et al. We present an attack that can predict all PUF responses after querying the PUF with n+2 attacker-chosen queries. This result renders the proposed RO-PUF with Enhanced Challenge-Response Pairs inapt for most typical PUF use cases, including but not limited to all cases where an attacker has query access.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-99828-2_9
Keywords: PUF
Contact author(s): nils wisiol @ fu-berlin de
History: 2018-09-22: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2018/862
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/862,
      author = {Nils Wisiol and Marian Margraf},
      title = {Attacking {RO}-{PUFs} with Enhanced Challenge-Response Pairs},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/862},
      year = {2018},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-99828-2_9},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/862}
}