Paper 2018/858
Stronger Security for Sanitizable Signatures
Stephan Krenn, Kai Samelin, and Dieter Sommer
Abstract
Sanitizable signature schemes (SSS) enable a designated party (called the sanitizer ) to alter admissible blocks of a signed message. This primitive can be used to remove or alter sensitive data from already signed messages without involvement of the original signer. Current state-of-the-art security definitions of SSSs only dene a \weak" form of security. Namely, the unforgeability, accountability and transparency definitions are not strong enough to be meaningful in certain use-cases. We identify some of these use-cases, close this gap by introducing stronger definitions, and show how to alter an existing construction to meet our desired security level. Moreover, we clarify a small yet important detail in the state-of-the-art privacy definition. Our work allows to deploy this primitive in more and different scenarios.
Note: Fixed a detail in the ENC IND-CPA definition
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. Data Privacy Management and Security Assurance 2015
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-319-29883-2_7
- Keywords
- digital signatures
- Contact author(s)
- kaispapers @ gmail com
- History
- 2018-11-03: revised
- 2018-09-22: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/858
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/858,
author = {Stephan Krenn and Kai Samelin and Dieter Sommer},
title = {Stronger Security for Sanitizable Signatures},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/858},
year = {2018},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-29883-2_7},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/858}
}
