Paper 2018/846
Strong Leakage Resilient Encryption: Enhancing Data Confidentiality by Hiding Partial Ciphertext
Jia Xu and Jianying Zhou
Abstract
Leakage-resilient encryption is a powerful tool to protect data confidentiality against side channel attacks. In this work, we introduce a new and strong leakage setting to counter
backdoor (or Trojan horse) plus covert channel attack, by relaxing the restrictions on leakage.
We allow \emph{bounded} leakage at \emph{anytime} and \emph{anywhere} and over \emph{anything}.
Our leakage threshold (e.g. 10000 bits) could be much larger than typical secret key (e.g. AES key or RSA private key) size.
Under such a strong leakage setting, we propose an efficient encryption scheme which is semantic secure in standard setting (i.e. without leakage) and can tolerate strong continuous leakage.
We manage to construct such a secure scheme under strong leakage setting, by hiding partial (e.g.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. International Journal of Information Security
- DOI
- 10.1007/s10207-020-00487-7
- Keywords
- Leakage Resilient EncryptionSecret SharingInformation Dispersal AlgorithmInformation-theoretic securitySide Channel AttackCovert Channel AttackSubliminal channelKolmogorov complexity
- Contact author(s)
- jiaxu2001 @ gmail com
- History
- 2020-06-08: last of 2 revisions
- 2018-09-14: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/846
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/846, author = {Jia Xu and Jianying Zhou}, title = {Strong Leakage Resilient Encryption: Enhancing Data Confidentiality by Hiding Partial Ciphertext}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/846}, year = {2018}, doi = {10.1007/s10207-020-00487-7}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/846} }