Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/827

Practical Strategy-Resistant Privacy-Preserving Elections

Sébastien Canard and David Pointcheval and Quentin Santos and Jacques Traoré

Abstract: Recent advances in cryptography promise to let us run complex algorithms in the encrypted domain. However, these results are still mostly theoretical since the running times are still much larger than their equivalents in the plaintext domain. In this context, Majority Judgment is a recent proposal for a new voting system with several interesting practical advantages, but which implies a more involved tallying process than first-past-the-post voting. To protect voters' privacy, such a process needs to be done by only manipulating encrypted data.

In this paper, we then explore the possibility of computing the (ordered) winners in the Majority Judgment election without leaking any other information, using homomorphic encryption and multiparty computation. We particularly focus on the practicality of such a solution and, for this purpose, we optimize both the algorithms and the implementations of several cryptographic building blocks. Our result is very positive, showing that this is as of now possible to attain practical running times for such a complex privacy-protecting tallying process, even for large-scale elections.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Privacy, voting

Original Publication (in the same form): ESORICS 2018
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-319-98989-1_17

Date: received 4 Sep 2018

Contact author: david pointcheval at ens fr

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20180906:195248 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/827


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